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Romania’s	protests	and	the	PSD:	Understanding	the
deep	malaise	that	now	exists	in	Romanian	society
Anti-government	protests	in	Romania	have	made	international	headlines,	with	over	400	people	left
injured	following	clashes	between	protesters	and	police	on	10	August.	Dennis	Deletant	writes	that	the
protests	are	a	symptom	of	a	growing	malaise	in	Romanian	society	fostered	by	the	ruling	Social
Democrats	that	is	estranging	the	citizen	from	the	state.
Massive	anti-government	protests,	held	in	Bucharest	and	in	other	major	cities	in	Romania	on	10	August
and	involving	more	than	150,000	people,	have,	for	the	second	time	in	the	last	eighteen	months,	thrown	Romania	into
the	international	spotlight.	They	followed	nationwide	demonstrations	in	February	2017	against	the	ruling	Social
Democratic	Party	(PSD)	and	its	leader	Liviu	Dragnea,	and	their	attempts	to	undermine	the	rule	of	law	and	the	fight
against	corruption.
Most	Romanian	politicians	do	not	distinguish	between	the	public	and	private	purse.	In	its	Corruption	Perception	Index
for	2017,	where	the	position	1	represents	the	least	corrupt	state,	Transparency	International	ranked	Romania	joint
59th	with	Greece	(out	of	180	countries),	up	from	58th	place	the	previous	year	but	lower	than	Hungary	(66)	and
Bulgaria	(71)	among	European	Union	members.	The	spark	for	last	year’s	protests,	the	largest	seen	in	Romania	since
the	revolution,	was	the	furtive	issue	of	an	executive	order	–	it	did	not	go	through	parliament	–	to	decriminalise
misconduct	by	public	officials	causing	damage	worth	less	than	$48,000.	It	opened	the	PSD	to	the	charge	that	it	was
not	a	party	that	represented	the	interests	of	disadvantaged	social	groups	and	the	working	class,	but	one	for	corrupt
oligarchs	and	bureaucrats.	In	effect,	the	PSD	government,	it	can	be	argued,	was	seeking	to	legalise	corruption,
transforming	its	de	facto	status	into	a	de	jure	one.
The	government	quickly	rescinded	the	measure,	only	to	continue	its	attack	on	the	rule	of	law	with	a	new	Justice
Reform	Bill,	introduced	by	the	government	at	the	beginning	of	September	2017,	that	attracted	widespread	criticism,
both	within	Romania	and	from	the	United	States	and	EU.	One	key	change	was	that	the	Attorney	General	and	the
heads	of	the	National	Anti-Corruption	Directorate	(DNA),	and	the	Directorate	for	Investigating	Organized	Crime	and
Terrorism	(DIICOT),	would	in	future	be	appointed	by	the	Higher	Magistrates’	Council	(CSM)	on	the	proposal	of	the
Justice	Minister.	Previously,	they	were	appointed	by	the	CSM	on	the	proposal	of	the	President.	Experts	on	the	rule	of
law	warned	that	the	proposals	in	the	bill	might	place	serious	limits	on	the	independence	of	prosecutors.
The	European	Commission	renewed	its	criticism	of	the	proposed	reform	of	the	justice	system.	A	joint	statement
released	in	Brussels	on	24	January	2018	by	European	Commission	President	Juncker	and	First	Vice-President
Timmermans	“on	the	latest	developments	in	Romania”	warned:
‘We	are	following	the	latest	developments	in	Romania	with	concern.	The	independence	of	Romania’s
judicial	system	and	its	capacity	to	fight	corruption	effectively	are	essential	cornerstones	of	a	strong
Romania	in	the	European	Union.	The	Commission	calls	on	the	Romanian	Parliament	to	rethink	the
course	of	action	proposed,	to	open	up	the	debate	in	line	with	the	Commission’s	recommendations	and	to
build	a	broad	consensus	on	the	way	forward.
The	Commission	reiterates	its	readiness	to	cooperate	with	and	support	the	Romanian	authorities	in	this
process.	The	Commission	again	warns	against	backtracking	and	will	look	thoroughly	at	the	final
amendments	to	the	justice	law,	the	criminal	codes	and	laws	on	conflict	of	interest	and	corruption	to
determine	the	impact	on	efforts	to	safeguard	the	independence	of	the	judiciary	and	combat	corruption.’
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The	Commission’s	warning	fell	on	deaf	ears.	Dragnea’s	thirst	for	power	has	embroiled	him	in	several	corruption
scandals.	In	April	2016,	he	was	given	a	two-year	suspended	sentence	for	attempting	to	rig	a	2012	national
referendum	calling	for	impeachment	of	the	President,	Traian	Băsescu,	a	conviction	that	prevented	Dragnea	from
becoming	Prime	Minister.	On	13	November	2017,	the	DNA	announced	that	it	had	charged	Dragnea	and	the	heads	of
a	construction	company	Tel	Drum	with	embezzlement	in	2001	of	EU	funds	granted	for	road	improvements	in
Dragnea’s	home	county	of	Teleorman.	The	DNA’s	press	communiqué	stated	that	it	was	acting	on	a	dossier	compiled
and	presented	by	OLAF,	the	European	Anti-Fraud	Agency,	on	30	September	2017.	Most	recently,	on	21	June	of	this
year,	Dragnea	was	convicted	over	a	fake	jobs	scandal	and	sentenced	to	three-and-a-half	years	in	jail.	On	4	July,
Parliament	passed	the	Justice	Reform	Bill	into	law	amidst	the	protest	of	President	Klaus	Iohannis.	Only	five	days
later,	Iohannis	was	forced	by	the	PSD	and	its	allies	in	parliament	to	sack	the	head	of	the	DNA,	Laura	Codruța
Kovesi.
These	developments	served	to	add	fuel	to	the	street	protests.	They	were	organised	by	the	Romanian	diaspora	who
returned	to	the	country	in	large	numbers	during	the	holiday	month	of	August.	In	Bucharest,	the	protests	started
peacefully	but	later	led	to	violent	clashes	between	the	police	and	some	demonstrators	who	attempted	to	break
through	the	police	barricades	surrounding	the	government	headquarters.	The	heavy-handed	police	response,
involving	the	use	of	tear-gas,	pepper	spray,	and	a	water	cannon,	left	452	people	injured,	of	whom	seventy	were
hospitalised,	including	three	gendarmes.	The	Austrian	Chancellor	Sebastian	Kurz	condemned	the	‘violent
confrontations	in	Bucharest,	at	which	numerous	protesters	and	journalists	were	injured’.	For	her	part,	Romania’s
Prime	Minister,	Viorica	Dăncilă,	sent	a	letter	to	Jean-Claude	Juncker	in	which	she	alleged	that	other	politicians,
including	Romanian	President	Klaus	Iohannis,	had	tried	‘to	violently	remove	a	legitimate	government.’
Romania	and	the	PSD
That	legitimacy	rests	on	the	ironic	fact	that	the	PSD	has	been	the	most	successful	party	at	the	polls	since	the
revolution.	The	party’s	success	can	be	explained	by	a	number	of	factors.	First,	it	inherited	the	organisational	base	of
the	Communist	Party.	Second,	it	can	rely	on	a	core	electorate,	constituted	largely	of	peasant	farmers	with	a	low
income	and	pensioners.	Almost	one-third	of	Romania’s	population	is	made	up	of	peasants.	Their	status	is	described
by	Alina	Mungiu,	a	prominent	political	analyst,	in	the	following	words:	‘seven	million	peasants,	who	barely	reach
subsistence	levels,	have	no	idea	of	the	difference	between	the	political	right	and	left…	and	pose	a	development
problem	not	just	for	Romania,	but	for	the	European	Union	in	general.	It	is	hard	to	believe	that	by	the	twenty-first
century	the	peasant	problem	in	Romania	had	not	only	remained	unsolved,	it	had	actually	been	recreated	close	to	its
historical	original,	in	spite	of	the	efforts	to	eliminate	rural	underdevelopment’.
The	PSD	has	attempted	to	alleviate	the	poverty	level	by	raising	pensions	and	by	tempting	their	electorate	with	free
food	and	drink	during	elections.	These	measures	enable	it	to	consistently	poll	some	three	million	votes	in
parliamentary	elections,	indeed	in	the	2016	elections	it	received	45%	of	the	popular	vote,	whereas	the	opposition
parties	struggle	to	even	approach	that	figure.	And	without	an	organised	and	united	opposition,	the	PSD	is	likely	use
parliament	to	manipulate	the	law	in	an	effort	to	keep	Dragnea	out	of	jail.
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Liviu	Dragnea,	Credit:	Partidul	Social	Democrat	(CC	BY	2.0)
On	the	economic	front,	a	positive	factor	is	that	Romania	registered	the	highest	economic	growth	in	the	EU	in	the	first
quarter	of	2017,	with	a	GDP	growth	of	5.6	percent	compared	with	the	same	period	of	2016,	according	to	flash
estimates	published	by	Eurostat,	the	statistics	office	of	the	EU.	The	country	has	a	significant	domestic	consumption
base,	with	the	largest	consumer	market	in	South	East	Europe.	Growth	in	2017	was	fuelled	by	strong	private
consumption,	which	more	than	compensated	for	a	slowdown	in	fixed	investment	and	deteriorating	exports.	However,
there	are	vulnerabilities	in	the	economy.	Investment,	both	private	and	public,	fell	significantly	over	the	early	months	of
2017	and	foreign	investment	was	down	20%	compared	with	the	same	period	last	year.	While	GDP	increased,	so,
too,	did	government	debt.
Major	obstacles	in	the	path	of	Romania’s	progress	towards	economic	development	and	bureaucratic	efficiency	are
administrative	weakness,	a	lack	of	professionalism	and	widespread	incompetence	in	the	public	domain.	In	late
November	2012,	the	EU	delivered	stinging	criticism	of	Romania’s	inability	to	access	EU	funds.	Romania	took	up	little
more	than	12	percent	of	the	19.6	billion	euros	in	EU	Structural	and	Cohesion	funds	it	was	eligible	to	receive	in	the
2007-13	budget	cycle.	In	autumn	2012,	the	Romanian	government	suspended	EU	programmes	meant	to	modernise
the	country’s	infrastructure	and	Romania	permanently	lost	funding	amounting	to	200	million	euros	for	its	inability	to
submit	viable	projects	in	time.	This	failure	to	take	advantage	of	EU	money	obviously	slows	down	the	implementation
of	measures	required	under	the	acquis	communautaire.
Under	the	EU	budget	for	2014-2020,	agreed	in	Brussels	on	8	February	2013	and	capped	at	€960	billion,	Romania	is
set	to	receive	€21.8bn,	some	€2bn	more	than	it	received	in	the	period	2007-2013.	Romania	will	also	receive	€17.5bn
in	funds	for	agriculture	in	2014-2020	under	the	common	agricultural	policy,	up	from	€13.8bn	in	2007-2013.	However,
Romania’s	absorption	of	European	money	under	the	2014-2020	financial	framework	stood	at	0.98	percent	at	the	end
of	November	2016,	while	the	average	rate	recorded	in	the	European	Union	reached	2.6	percent,	according	to	Dragoș
Dinu,	the	minister	of	EU	funds	in	the	Romanian	government.
Romania’s	geostrategic	importance
To	set	against	the	debit	column	of	its	record,	the	PSD	can	point	to	the	reality	that	Romania	sits	firmly	within
the	strategic	interests	of	the	US	and	the	EU.	That	strategic	interest	is	linked	to	the	emphasis	placed	by	the	United
States	and	the	EU	on	the	rule	of	law.	Failure	to	respect	it	and	widespread	corruption	pose	a	danger	to	the	internal
cohesion	and	stability	of	the	state,	a	danger	underlined	by	Romania’s	NATO	and	EU	partners.	The	country’s	location
in	South-Eastern	Europe,	on	Ukraine’s	border,	makes	it	a	strategic	ally	for	the	US.	The	Dniester	River	is	80
kilometres	from	Odessa,	the	main	port	on	the	Black	Sea	for	Ukraine.	The	Prut	River	is	about	300	kilometres	from
Bucharest.
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Between	these	two	rivers	sits	one	of	Romania’s	neighbours:	Moldova.	Moldova	is	an	area	of	competition	between
Russia	on	the	one	hand,	and	the	European	Union	and	NATO	on	the	other.	In	Western	hands,	Moldova	threatens
Russia’s	security	interests	in	the	Black	Sea.	In	Russian	hands,	Moldova	threatens	Bucharest.	For	Russia,	military
operations	in	Moldova	and	the	breakaway	territory	of	Transnistria	would	be	more	complicated	than	in	Crimea	given
the	distance	from	the	Russian	mainland	and	the	need	to	fly	through	Ukrainian	or	Romanian	airspace	to	resupply
troops	in	Transnistria.	This	need	would	be	obviated	should	Russia	control	Odessa	and	the	area	bordering	upon	the
northern	arm	of	the	Danube,	bringing	it	to	the	frontier	both	of	Transnistria	and	Romania.
The	credible	security	guarantees	sought	by	Romania	from	the	United	States	are	inherent	in	the	US-Romania
Security	Partnership.	The	US	uses	Mihail	Kogălniceanu	Air	Base,	which	is	on	Romania’s	Black	Sea	coast,
approximately	15	miles	from	downtown	Constanța,	the	country’s	largest	port	and	second	largest	city.	The	airport	has
a	3,500	metre	(11,482	foot)	runway,	which	is	key	for	hosting	large	military	transport	and	tanker	aircraft.
In	2003,	Mihail	Kogălniceanu	became	one	of	four	Romanian	military	facilities	that	were	used	by	U.S.	military	forces
as	a	staging	area	for	the	invasion	of	and	ongoing	counter-insurgency	efforts	in	Iraq.	It	became	one	of	the	main
operating	bases	of	U.S.	Army	Europe’s	Joint	Task	Force	East,	a	rotating	task	force	initially	provided	by	the	U.S.	2nd
Cavalry	Regiment.	The	base	is	also	alleged	to	have	been	one	of	the	“black	sites”	where	terrorist	suspects	were
interrogated	in	the	CIA’s	network	of	extraordinary	rendition	facilities.
In	2010,	a	Black	Sea	Rotational	Force	(BSRF)	was	established	on	the	initiative	of	the	US	with	the	purpose	of	forming
a	Security	Cooperation	Marine	Air-Ground	Task	Force.	The	BSRF	Rotational	is	an	annual	multilateral	security
cooperation	activity	between	the	U.S.	Marine	Corps	and	partner	nations	in	the	Black	Sea,	Balkan	and	Caucasus
regions	designed	to	enhance	participants’	collective	professional	military	capacity,	promote	regional	stability	and
build	enduring	relationships	with	partner	nations.	Some	350	Marine	Corps	and	U.S.	Navy	personnel	of	BSRF	operate
as	a	Special-Purpose	Marine	Air-Ground	Task	Force.	The	biannual	rotation	of	Marines	and	sailors	with	BSRF,
conducted	under	the	US	European	Command	(EUCOM),	is	centred	around	the	Mihail	Kogălniceanu	airbase.
As	a	sign	of	its	strong	commitment	to	the	NATO	alliance,	Romania	signed	an	agreement	with	the	US	on	13
September	2011	to	station	a	ballistic	missile	defence	system	at	the	Deveselu	air	base	near	Caracal,	some	150km	(90
miles)	to	the	south-west	of	Bucharest.	The	system	employs	the	SM-3	interceptor	(also	referred	to	as	the	‘Aegis
Ashore	System’).	The	base	was	commissioned	on	October	10,	2014	and	the	system	became	operational	(i.e.	it	was
integrated	into	the	NATO	ballistic	missile	defence	system)	on	12	May	2016.
Romania	is	among	five	other	NATO	countries	that	have	stepped	up	their	military	outlay	to	meet	the	requirement	–
pushed	by	US	president	Donald	Trump	–	of	spending	two	percent	of	GDP	on	defence.	The	procurement	of	the
Patriot	missile	system,	announced	in	October	2017,	will	contribute	to	Romania	meeting	that	NATO	target.	The
agreement	with	US	defence	firm	Raytheon,	worth	3.9	billion	euros,	was	signed	on	November	29,	2017.	Defence
minister	Mihai	Fifor	announced	at	the	same	time	that	a	second	military	deal	was	under	negotiation	under	which
General	Dynamics,	another	US	defence	contractor,	would	make	Piranha	V	armoured	fighting	vehicles	at	Romania’s
state-owned	Bucharest	Mechanical	Factory.
A	deep	malaise	in	Romanian	society
The	deepening	integration	of	Romania	into	NATO	is	offset	by	the	fact	that	good	government	still	eludes	Romania.
The	failure	of	the	political	class,	and	in	particular	of	the	ruling	PSD,	to	align	actions	with	the	values	of	the	EU,	has
serious	economic	and	social	consequences	for	the	country.	A	clear	sign	of	the	lack	of	confidence	in	the	future
amongst	young	Romanians	is	the	scale	of	emigration.	More	than	3.4	million	of	the	country’s	twenty-two	million
citizens	left	Romania	between	2007	and	2017,	some	17%	of	the	population,	the	second	greatest	number	of
emigrants	after	Syria,	and	this	from	a	country	not	torn	by	war.
Romania’s	resident	population	declined	by	122,000	people	in	2016,	reaching	19.63	million	as	of	1	January	2017,
according	to	data	from	the	National	Statistics	Institute	(INS).	Of	major	concern	is	the	exodus	of	young	people,	those
aged	between	15	and	29.	Their	numbers	have	fallen	by	28%,	from	4.6	million	in	2008	to	3.5	million	in	2016.	The
scale	of	emigration	has	serious	consequences	for	the	country’s	budget	and	for	the	labour	market,	and	thus	economic
growth.	A	net	decline	in	the	labour	force	affects	tax	returns	to	the	state.	At	the	same	time,	the	continuing	increase	in
the	ratio	of	people	in	older	dependent	age	groups	relative	to	those	in	working-age	groups	increases	the	financial
pressure	on	health	and	social	security	systems.	Without	effective	measures	to	address	these	problems	Romania’s
economic	and	social	development	will	be	hindered.
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The	August	protests	are	a	symptom	of	a	growing	malaise	in	Romanian	society	fostered	by	the	PSD	that	is	estranging
the	citizen	from	the	state.	Recent	measures	taken	by	the	PSD	to	blur	the	separation	of	power	between	the
government	and	the	judiciary	threaten	to	undermine	democracy	in	the	country	and	to	weaken	its	capacity	to	remain	a
credible	ally	for	NATO,	and	to	respect	the	core	values	of	the	EU.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	and	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy,	nor
of	the	London	School	of	Economics.
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